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Environmental policy must be turned on its head:
instead of mulling over for the thousandth time about
which technical measures can be applied to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions, we should turn to the core
question of how to induce the resource owners to
leave more carbon underground, as that is the sole
possible way to solve the climate problem.
The simple but usually overlooked fact is:other than
the useful but limited afforestation efforts, there are
only two ways to curb the accumulation of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere and, with it, slow down
global warming. We either temporarily refrain from
extracting carbon from the ground, or we stuff it
back into the ground after having extracted its ener-
gy. All the technical endeavours to develop alterna-
tive technologies and all economic incentive systems
to curb the greenhouse effect must subordinate
themselves to this fundamental fact.
Bringing carbon dioxide back underground is easier
said than done. One third of the primary energy in
the original fuel will be consumed by scrubbing CO2
from the exhaust and subsequently compressing it
into a liquid. On top of that, the amount of storage
volume required is gargantuan, as each carbon atom
has been joined by two oxygen atoms upon combus-
tion – and they all need to be stored.Thus,in the case
of anthracite coal more than five times as much vol-
ume is required as the original fuel occupied under-
ground, while in the case of crude oil the proportion
is more than three-fold. According to estimates by
the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change),the Earth’s depleted coal mines and oil and
gas deposits will offer room for only some 600 giga-
tons of carbon, barely one tenth of the recoverable
carbon resources (6,500 gigatons). For that reason, if
we are to curb climate change, carbon extraction
rates must be slowed down. The resource owners
must be prompted to temporarily leave more carbon
underground.
Those convinced that with the brave new technolo-
gies proudly displayed in many newspapers’ spe-
cial sections we can avert climate change should
specify how they would move resource owners to
extract less fossil fuel. And that is precisely the
sticking point.Politics so far exhibits not the slight-
est glimmer of thinking in this direction. From the
Environmental Agency through the Greens to the
relevant European Commission there is not a thing
on the matter. Even science itself overlooks the
issue. Energy models depicting the long-term
extraction path of fossil fuel resources do not con-
cern themselves with the climate. Climate-theoret-
ical models, in turn, do not concern themselves
with the extraction of such resources; they are in
fact atemporal models that, by their very nature,
are not in a position to analyse decision issues that
have an intertemporal dimension. Only now,
thanks to the influence of the current German
debate, a bit of movement is becoming apparent in
the model front.
This silence goes hand in hand with the acknowl-
edged difficulty of being able to do something in
this regard at all.What we in Europe and Germany
have set in motion with untold billions invested is
geared at gradually reducing demand for fossil fuels
by developing alternative energy sources and strate-
gies. The range of initiatives goes from biofuels
through wind power to better insulating homes and
capping vehicles’ CO2 emissions. The measures to
reduce consumption exert an increasingly stronger
downward pressure upon the world’s fossil fuel mar-
ket price and dampen the rate of increase in such
prices.
Resource owners regard this development with con-
cern.They rightly fear the erosion of the rate of cap-
ital gains on the resources still in situ, moving them
to react by bringing forward their extraction plans
and converting a larger portion of their wealth into
cash and securing it as financial capital. They thusCESifo Forum 3/2009 11
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increase their fossil fuel supply when demand for
them decreases. This is the green paradox: environ-
mental policies that turn increasingly greener over
time operate like announced expropriations. They
prompt resource owners to try to escape this by
accelerating extraction of their fossil fuels, which in
turn speeds up the warming of the planet.
Small wonder then that the massive efforts of
Europeans have delayed the peaking of the world’s
carbon dioxide emissions curve to the future.In fact,
they have not been able to cause even the tiniest dip
in this curve.
By saving ever more energy we are raising fears of
the future among resource owners and leading them
to increase the extraction rate. This has been music
in the ears of Americans, Chinese and all other envi-
ronmental sinners. They have enjoyed the resulting
lower energy prices and raised their consumption by
even more than we have reduced ours.
Some observers pin their hopes on a different effect:
that the green policies push the price of fossil fuels in
the world market so far down that they fall below the
extraction costs, making extraction unprofitable.
Demand would then drop, as green policies intend.
This hope is baseless, however, because, like old
Rembrandts, resource prices are not driven by cost
but by scarcity, and these hover always far above the
extraction costs. That is even now the case, in the
midst of the dramatic fall in prices triggered by the
current economic crisis.With oil prices slightly below
60 dollars per barrel, the extraction costs including
exploration in the Gulf (but not mining rights, which
are part of the profit) amount to around one to one-
and-a-half dollars, and even the extraction of the
Canadian tar sands costs, including exploration, no
more than 15 dollars. In due course, fossil fuel prices
will steadily increase as the resources become
scarcer.At the same time, extraction will progress in
the direction of increasing extraction costs, as
resource owners save interest costs by beginning with
the sites that are more easily accessible. Presumably,
however, there will never be a point when extraction
costs overtake product prices – or even come near
them. An environmental policy based upon pushing
prices below production costs would need a big ham-
mer. Marginal measures as those currently in force
are plainly insufficient for that purpose.
This is just as well so, as the argument for perma-
nently sealing off part of the resources still in situ to
the detriment of generations far in the future finds
neither economic nor ethical justification. What we
need is a measured green policy that slows down
resource extraction and, with it, global warming, but
the green paradox shows that this goal cannot be
achieved with the policies currently in place in
Europe. The question is then, what brings us truly
closer to the goal? 
If a steadily greener policy accelerates resource
extraction, it may be worth thinking about a green
policy that turns to pale green as time goes by. Such
a policy would exert much higher pressure on prices
at the beginning but let up gradually over time, with
the effect that world market prices would drop
quickly to a fairly low level only to rise afterwards at
a steadily increasing rate. Climate change would be
slowed down, as intended.
But that is unfortunately only a theoretical solution
that is well nigh impossible to attain,as a steadily less
green policy would have difficulty gaining credibility
among the resource owners. The many proposals
concerning the long-term goals of climate policy
made by politicians all go in the opposite direction.
Energy consumption is to be reduced a little at the
beginning but with increasing zeal as time progress-
es. From the G8 Summit at Toyako in July 2008, in
which the participating countries committed to a
50 percent reduction goal up to 2050,to the ludicrous
proclamations of the German Left Party, who want
to reduce emissions by 90 percent by 2050, policies
follow the same pattern. The largest reduction
efforts are to be made in the far future,while the cur-
rent generations are largely spared. Politicians can-
not do otherwise, alas, as they do not want to inflict
the pain of immediate reductions upon their voters.
The year 2050 is so far in the future that the boldest
policy proposals can be made now without scaring
voters off. After all, the onus will fall later on other
citizens and other politicians who will have to tight-
en their belts.The consequence of this delaying poli-
cy is that the resource owners will move forward the
extraction of their resources.The quantities that the
politicians announce for future restriction spring
from the ground all the more copiously today.
An environmental policy subjected to the con-
straints of democratic discussion and that limits itself
to influencing the demand for fossil fuels cannot per-
suade resource owners that the price of their prod-
ucts will be less affected in the far future than now or
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owners will be plagued by the fear that, as the plan-
et becomes warmer and the resulting climate dam-
age more apparent, this policy will be tightened up
even further. As a result, it can hardly be expected
that a demand policy that attempts to influence sup-
ply through price signals will ever make a contribu-
tion towards curbing climate change.
A possibility to overcome this problem is to make it
unattractive for resource owners to convert their fos-
sil fuel wealth into financial investments. A global
shift from the residence to the source-country prin-
ciple in taxing interest income could achieve this
goal.This would not alter the tax on interest income
for the residents of consumer nations but would levy
higher taxes on interest income for the resource
owners, giving rise to an incentive to leave more of
the resource in situ, slowing down extraction and,
with it, climate change.
Another possibility is the formation of a seamless
consumer cartel in which all consumer countries
take part. Demand policies are ineffective if they
only encompass some of the countries, as they will
then only operate through price signals and are like-
ly to cause the green paradox.The non-participating
countries will then, at lower prices, not only gobble
up the fossil fuel quantities that are set free thanks to
the efforts of the Kyoto countries, but also the addi-
tional quantities the resource suppliers bring to the
market out of fear of a deteriorating business envi-
ronment for their products.
The situation is different if all consumer countries
accept a cap on consumption, as then the suppliers
will find no takers for their products and will have to
reduce extraction whether they want it or not. Ex-
pectations regarding the future will no longer play
any role. With consumption caps valid for all con-
sumer nations the playing field will be tilted in a
direction that does something for the climate.
These consumption caps could come about through
a global certificate trading system,extending the one
introduced by the UN for a number of countries in
2008. Granted, it would still be a market system that
allocates carbon volumes to the individual countries,
but now it would not be the resource owners who set
the extraction path, but the United Nations. The
resource owners could not wriggle free of the power
of the UN.
During the forthcoming world climate summit in
Copenhagen later this year the EU will try to create
such a Super-Kyoto system, given that it has been
working intensively towards such a goal for several
years.But it will probably fail again,as the road to an
all-encompassing consumption cap is still far away.
Thus far only the 27 EU nations, Canada,Australia,
Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia and
Ukraine have accepted a cap on CO2 emissions.The
rest of the world, including the United States, South
America, Africa and Asia from Turkey to China,
responsible for 70 percent of CO2 emissions, have
kept well clear of such a commitment.
The circumstances could change, however, if it
appears that the United States under the Obama
Administration sets off on a new course.In any case,
the new Director of the White House’s National
Economic Council, Lawrence Summers, has an-
nounced that the United States, after having over-
come the crisis,will introduce its own emissions trad-
ing system in 2011. After this, the step towards a
globe-spanning Super-Kyoto system should become
easier.
In principle a Super-Kyoto system would be similar
to the rationing that was practised after the war in
many European countries,when in order to buy food
one needed ration coupons or stamps that were
issued by governmental agencies according to social
criteria. To buy a pound of butter, a person had to
pay the proprietor the regulated price of the product
and at the same time give him a butter coupon. If
one did not have enough coupons,it was necessary to
trade coupons with other coupon recipients. The
mechanism would be very similar if trade in UN cer-
tificates were extended to all countries of the world.
The total amount of carbon that is available to the
countries could be rationed this way, and the distrib-
ution of the certificates via the UN trading system
and subordinate, regional trading systems, such as
that of the EU, would determine where carbon is
burnt.
The result would be attractive for the consumer
countries in two ways. Fossil carbon would not be
extracted so quickly,which would slow down climate
change. Secondly, the consumer countries would no
longer have to pay so much for their fuel.To be sure,
the energy costs for individual consumers would be
higher because they would also have to buy the cer-
tificates, but the state treasury of every country
would have more revenue and citizens would benefit
by the additional provision of public goods or from
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citizens and the state treasury,would pay less for fos-
sil resources because they would reduce their
demand, thus driving down world market prices.
From an economic viewpoint this Super-Kyoto sys-
tem basically amounts to a partial expropriation of
the resource owners and a partial substitute of the
market mechanism by a centrally planned control of
quantities. Since one is only allowed to use the
resources if one can produce the UN rationing
coupons, the UN will become, in economic terms
albeit not legally, the joint owner of the fossil fuel. If
it gives the national governments the right to sell
these rationing coupons, as will be the case at least
within the EU for the third trading period as of 2013,
then it will of course transfer its ownership rights to
the national governments. The revenue that these
governments achieve from the sale of the certificates
comes at the expense of the resource owning coun-
tries and would lower the market value of the stocks
in situ.
Whether we should set out along this path,in light of
the negative experience we have had with centrally
planned strategies, is a highly complex issue that is
difficult to decide. In the final analysis we will prob-
ably have no choice but to let the UN take over the
central planning.
This will certainly produce various negative behav-
ioural effects, as we know from central planning sys-
tems. A power centre will grow up around the UN
that will try to extricate itself from democratic con-
trols. The countries will begin to struggle with each
other over who is to be favoured in the allotment of
the certificates and will seek to obtain exceptions
from the necessity to purchase certificates. This in
turn will further strengthen the power of the UN
bureaucracy. Possibly a worldwide black market for
carbon will arise with a Mafia-style counter force
arising that escapes democratic controls.
The resource countries will do all they can to resist
such a solution.They will try to prevent the UN from
forming a worldwide demand cartel,and by granting
special deliveries of carbon fuel they will try to keep
as many countries as possible out of the cartel.They
will also try to form a counter cartel.The fact that the
OPEC is flirting with the idea of admitting Russia is
not surprising in light of these developments.
Moreover, the countries with the resources will
attempt to develop their own economies such that
they will be able to exploit their own fossil fuels
without limitations from the UN. Bearing these con-
siderations in mind, Dubai’s breathtaking economic
development can surely be understood as a rational
counter-strategy of a significant resource supply
country.
However, these avoidance manoeuvres will in turn
induce the demand countries to develop their own
counter strategies.The countries participating in the
cartel will not allow individual countries to acquire
fossil carbon without the proof of certificates, and
they will build up trade barriers to punish those who
deviate. All this will create a considerable conflict
potential that could lead to outbreaks of military
force.
Only the horror of a further warming of the atmos-
phere combined with the fact that the consumer
countries will have to keep on spending considerable
parts of their real income for the acquisition of con-
stantly dwindling amounts of carbon makes the
worldwide demand cartel that the UN is planning
attractive. Policy-makers have the choice between
Scylla and Charybdis.
If we wish to pursue the path to a Super-Kyoto sys-
tem, it is important that we do it quickly. Any delay
is poison for the climate, not only because in the
meantime emissions will continue unabated but
especially because a piecemeal inclusion of more
and more countries would have the ironic effect of
stoking the green paradox even further. If the num-
ber of countries accepting caps on their emissions
increases only bit by bit, this will give rise to an
increasingly larger price pressure over time that will
induce the resource owners to anticipate the wors-
ening of their profit margins by speeding up extrac-
tion.Paradoxically,the more successful the world cli-
mate summit is in gaining members to the worldwide
demand cartel over the coming decades, the more
rapidly will the world’s climate warm up in the initial
stages. Only taking the resource owners by surprise,
with an immediate completion of the cartel that pro-
ceeds so rapidly that the resource owners no longer
have the time to react by accelerating the extraction
of their resources, can bring about the desired
effects.